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We are working at a disadvantage .... The lack of uniforms, so
that you can't define the enemy very well. And the intertwining
of the enemy with combatants is very, very difficult. So you've
got combatants and non-combatants mixed together
intentionally.... [I]f you think about just the way that, for
instance, the Shi'ias could basically in this area right here,
thousands of pilgrims on their way into this region right here,
and the militia being able to just take off the black uniforms, and
blend right in, into all those pilgrims.'
At 4:45, while moving from (UNINTELLIGIBLE) to clear an
armed enemy-a coalition force was ambushed by enemy
elements of unknown size. Reports indicate at least 20 rocket
grenades were observed during the course of the engagement.
Forty to 50 armed individuals were observed, some wearing
black pajamas, uniforms, others wearing civilian clothes.2
The quotes above come from military operations by coalition forces
in Iraq in April 2004. They highlight a problem that occurs not only in
Iraq, but also in the numerous armed conflicts currently occurring
throughout the world. Modem war is no longer characterized by
"uniformed armies on a large plain, with civilians tucked away safely
far behind the front-lines."3 Rather, military operations are now
conducted in the contemporary operational environment,4 which
assumes 360-degree operations against asymmetric opponents5 who
1. Kelly McCann, CNN Live Sunday: U.S. Helicopter Shot Down in Iraq, Both Pilots Killed;
7 Chinese Citizens Taken Hostage in Iraq (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 11, 2004)
(041104CN.V36), transcript available at LEXIS, News File.
2. Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt, CNN Live Event: Coalition News Briefing (CNN
television broadcast, Apr. 11, 2004) (041101 CN.V54), available at LEXIS, News File; see also
Jason Callen, Unlawful Combatants and the Geneva Conventions, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 1025, 1026
(2004) (citing the strategic use of civilian dress by unlawful combatants).
3. Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of
Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 730 (2004) (stating also that "[i]n
fact, even the battles of the nineteenth century rarely fit this paradigm, and modem conflict fits
this paradigm still less well").
4. The Contemporary Operational Environment, in OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK NO. 02-8, at http://www.strategypage.
com/articles/operationenduringfreedom/chapl.asp (last visited Sept. 21, 2005).
5. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Virtuous Warrior in a Savage World, 8 USAFA J. LEG. STUD. 71,
72 (1997-98) ("In broad terms, 'asymmetrical' warfare describes strategies that seek to avoid an
opponent's strengths; it is an approach that focuses whatever may be one side's comparative
advantages against their enemy's relative weaknesses."); see also Michael N. Schmitt, The Impact
of High and Low-Tech Warfare on the Principle of Distinction, Harvard Program on
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative
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strike at known weaknesses, including a nation's compliance with the
law of war.6
When faced with such opponents, militaries intent on complying with
the law of war struggle between the requirements of distinction7 and
their desire to protect non-combatants, and the practical reality of
protecting their force from fighters8 such as those mentioned in the
initial quotes who act as combatants when engaging in combat but
dissolve into the crowd of non-combatants when faced with opposing
military forces.9 These fighters, who may be members of insurgent
Briefing Paper 1, 2, 12-13 (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.ihlresearch.org/ihl/pdfs/
briefing3296.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2005) (asserting that "military dominance in a conflict,
whether State-on-State, as in the war with Iraq, or non-State actor-on-State, as in the case of the
Palestinian uprising or transnational terrorism, paradoxically leads disadvantaged opponents to
respond asymmetrically with low-tech, albeit highly effective, methods and means"); cf Sylvain
Charat, Three Weapons to Fight Terror, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2004, at A23, available at
LEXIS, News File (alleging that terrorism is the prototypical type of asymmetric warfare).
6. See David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Leashing the Dogs of War, NAT'L INTEREST,
Fall 2003, at 9 (asserting that those who reject the controlling force of law of war create the
largest contemporary security threat, and that those groups, in intentional disregard of such law,
strategically endanger and attack civilians); see also R. George Wright, Combating Civilian
Casualties: Rules and Balancing in the Developing Law of War, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 129,
131 (2003) (stating that some combatants intentionally ignore the law of war or manipulate such
law to gain strategic advantage); cf William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates: A Post-
September 11th Proposal to Rationalize the Laws of War, 73 MISS. L.J. 639, 673-74 (2004)
(asserting that the asymmetric nature of respect for the law of war makes deterrence strategies
useless against military forces that choose to ignore legal conventions); Col. Charles J. Dunlap,
Jr., Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Century Conflicts,
Carr Center for Human Rights Policy 4, 5 (2001), available online at http://www.ksg.harvard.
edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%2OPapers/Use%20of%2OForce/Dunlap2001.pdf (last visited Sept.
21, 2005) (arguing that if the law of war remains as it is, it may be problematic because those who
reject the confines of the law of war can manipulate the laws in order to endanger civilians).
7. See Mark D. Maxwell, The Law of War and Civilians on the Battlefield: Are We
Undermining Civilian Protections?, MIL. REV., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 17-18 (describing the
principle of distinction and what steps must be taken in distinguishing between civilians, lawful
combatants, and unlawful combatants as well as the implications of this process for targeting
decisions); Kenneth Watkin, Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in
Contemporary Armed Conflict, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 15-17 (2004); Schmitt, supra note 5, at 1, 7;
Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the Rubicon?, 51 A.F.
L. REV. 111, 113-14 (2001); Francisco Forrest Martin, Using International Human Rights Law
for Establishing a Unified Use of Force Rule in the Law of Armed Conflict, 64 SASK. L. REV.
347, 352 (2001) (arguing that in seeking to minimize civilian casualties in pursuance with
international war conventions, states have created the unintended effect of reduced casualty rates
among opposing combatants).
8. Daniel P. Schoenekase, Targeting Decisions Regarding Human Shields: Civilians on the
Battlefield, MIL. REV., Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 26-27; Ken Dilanian, U.S. Troops Walk the Fine Line,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 13, 2005, available at LEXIS, News File.
9. See Edward Wong & Eric Schmitt, Rebel Fighters Who Fled Attack May Now Be Active
Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, at Al (describing insurgents' use of their ability to blend
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groups,° guerrillas," disaffected citizens,12 or terrorists, 3 do not receive
the protections and benefits of combatant status based on the criteria set
out in article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (GPW).14 This combatant status is
something they greatly desire because of the attendant combatant
immunity for warlike acts. 5
These battlefield fighters do not receive combatant status because
under current international law, this status is an all-or-nothing
with civilians to evade U.S. forces in Iraq); cf Laura Lopez, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of
Applying International Humanitarian Law to Internal Armed Conflicts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 916,
928-29 (1994) (describing guerrillas' use of civilian clothing to conceal identity).
10. Though terms such as insurgent, guerrilla, and terrorist have specific meaning to specific
people, those definitions are often inconsistent; a person who is labeled an insurgent by one may
be identified as a guerrilla by another. See, e.g., Matthew Brzezinski, Surrealpolitik; How a
Chechen Terror Suspect Wound up Living on Taxpayers' Dollars Near the National Zoo, WASH.
POST, Mar. 20, 2005 (Magazine), available at LEXIS, News File (detailing the quarrel between
Russia and the United States over a Chechen leader who has been given asylum in the United
States despite the fact that Russians consider him a terrorist); see also Milan Judge to Sue in
'Guerrillas not Terrorists'Row, Ansa Eng. Media Serv., Feb. 7, 2005, available at LEXIS, News
File (describing an Italian judge who angered the Italian government by finding that indicted
terror suspects were guerrillas and not terrorists); cf Michael L. Gross, Bioethics and Armed
Conflict: Mapping the Moral Dimensions of Medicine and War, Hastings Center Rep., Nov. 1,
2004, at 22, available at LEXIS, News File; The UN. and the Fight Against Terrorism: Hearing
of the Int 'l Terrorism and Nonproliferation Subcomm. Of the House Int ' Relations Comm., Fed.
News Serv., Mar. 17, 2005, available at LEXIS, News File (highlighting the lack of a concrete
international definition of terrorism).
11. See, e.g., FARC Losing Battle to Government, Analyst Says, Asia Afr. Intelligence Wire,
Oct. 13, 2004, available at INFOTRAC, Gale Group File.
12. See, e.g., Senior US. Military Officer Reviews Challenges in Latin America, States News
Serv., Mar. 16, 2005, available at LEXIS, News File (discussing the disaffected civilian populace
in Bolivia and its effect on the government); cf Bill Torpy, War Shifts Gears as Allied Troops
Tackle Reaching Out to Civilians, Cox News Serv., Apr. 11, 2003, available at LEXIS, News
File (citing the importance of military forces cultivating relationships with civilians in the
occupied zones).
13. See, e.g., S. Korea Assessing Iraq Troop Deployment After Death of 2 Civilians, AFX-
Asia, Dec. 1, 2003, available at LEXIS, News File (regarding the effect of deliberate targeting of
civilians by terrorists in South Korea's decision on whether to send troops to Iraq).
14. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI TOMAN, THE LAWS OF
ARMED CONFLICTS 434-35 (2d ed. 1981). Mercenaries are also specifically precluded from
combatant status. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, adopted June 10, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3; see also Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle With Scope, Will Travel: The Global
Economy of Mercenary Violence, 30 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 35-37 (1999).
15. Jordan J. Paust, Current Pressures on International Humanitarian Law: War and Enemy
Status after 9/11: Attacks on the Law of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325, 330 (2003); see also
William H. Ferrell, III, No Shirt, No Shoes, No Status: Uniforms, Distinction, and Special
Operations in International Armed Conflict, 178 MIL. L. REV. 94, 97-98 (2003).
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proposition. Either a fighting force qualifies under all the criteria of
article 4 of the GPW and receives all the privileges and immunities of
combatant status, or a force does not qualify, and is provided no
protection above that of any other civilian in the area, and may even be
disqualified from the protections afforded to civilians. Given the reality
of today's battlefields where the conflict is seldom between the armed
forces of two nations, these requirements are counterproductive in the
world's attempts to protect noncombatants.16 Providing fighters none of
the benefits of combatant status unless they meet all the requirements of
article 4 of the GPW provides a disincentive for fighters to distinguish
themselves from the civilian population. Rather, the proscriptions on
attacking non-combatants actually give those who would not otherwise
get combatant immunity an incentive to move in and out of the civilian
population at their convenience.
To remedy this counterproductive state of the law, the all-or-nothing
nature of combatant status should evolve to allow for intermediate
levels of recognition in response to partial compliance with the
traditional combatant requirements. As those on the battlefield comply
with portions of the combatant requirements, particularly that of
distinguishing themselves from noncombatants, they should accrue
privileges commensurate with their efforts. These intermediate
privileges should include immunity from prosecution for speech or
association crimes connected with political beliefs; abeyance of
execution of punishment until conflict is resolved; offer of parole,
including immunity for weapons crimes not resulting in death or injury;
compliance with international law as a mitigating factor at sentencing;
disallowance of the death penalty; and, if the movement which the
fighter is a part of eventually achieves combatant status, the fighter's
prior lawful warlike actions should also be covered by combatant
immunity. Providing intermediate levels of recognition for partial
compliance will provide incentives for otherwise unlawful combatants
16. See George H. Aldrich, The Hague Peace Conferences: The Laws of War on Land, 94
AM. J. INT'L. L. 42 (2000) (listing combatant status and protection of noncombatants as two of the
top five areas of the law that need further development in the early 21st century); see also Lt. Col.
Paul Kantwill & Maj. Sean Watts, "Hostile Protected Persons" or "Extra-Conventional
Persons ": How Unlawful Combatants in the War on Terrorism Posed Extraordinary Challenges
for Military Attorneys and Commanders, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 681, 705-08 (2005) (detailing
the U.S. Administration's lack of consideration of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons In Time of War when considering the status of fighters captured in
Afghanistan during the global war on terror).
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to comply with international law without eroding the maximum benefits
offered to those who comply with all requirements of combatant status.
This Article will begin by briefly reviewing the history of combatant
status under international law. It will then review the current
international law of combatant status, including an analysis of article 4
of the GPW and the requirements and privileges associated with
combatant status. The principle of distinction and protection for
noncombatants will be reviewed, with particular attention to how the
current rules for combatants do not support this principle. The Article
will then examine how developing trends are also counterproductive to
the protection of combatants, as illustrated by the controversial
provisions on combatant status in the 1977 Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of Augustl2, 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (GPI). 17 This discussion
will be followed by an explanation of how changing the law to provide
intermediate levels of recognition for partial compliance with the law of
war will give fighters an incentive to distinguish themselves, thereby
increasing protections to noncombatants.
I. HISTORY OF COMBATANT STATUS
Though almost every culture has had rules concerning the conduct of
hostilities,"s the modern law of armed conflict, including the idea of
combatant status, is generally a western notion 9 and began developing
(particularly in the area of defining who is a combatant) during the age
of chivalry.20 During these times of knighthood and its limited warrior
class, including thejus militare, certain ideas of who should and should
17. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, supra note 14, 1125
U.N.T.S. at 23-25. The United States recognizes portions of GPI as customary international law.
See generally Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary Law
to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
419 (1987) (discussing which articles of GPI the United States believes are customary
international law and to which the United States objects).
18. See, e.g., SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 76 (Samuel Griffith trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1963) (illustrating where Sun Tzu, in the 5th century B.C., wrote, "Treat the captives well, and
care for them....Generally in war the best policy is to take a state intact; to ruin it is inferior to
this."); cf Bradford, supra note 6, at 641 n.12 ("Many ancient cultures, religions, and belief
systems developed rules distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants and limiting
methods and means of warfare.").
19. Brooks, supra note 3, at 706.
20. See Thomas C. Wingfield, Chivalry in the Use of Force, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 111, 114
(2001). Wingfield gives an excellent overview of the laws of war during the Age of Chivalry
(approximately 1100-1500 A.D.).
[Vol. 46:1
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not participate in conflict began to solidify. 21 Much of this corresponded
with the rise of the nation-state and its dominance as the major player in
international relations.22
As the feudal system gave way to the rise of professional armies,
these chivalric codes began to break down and local populations began
to take a more active role in hostilities. Thus began a breakdown of the
clear line between combatants and noncombatants. Nathan Canestaro
writes:
The erosion of the line between civilians and the professional
military began with the fundamental changes in warfare seen in
the Napoleonic era. The expanding scale of warfare, the advent
of popular revolutions in some European countries, especially
France, and repeated clashes between professional soldiers and
armed peasantry during the Napoleonic wars, brought
commoners into warfare in significant numbers for the first
23time.
Perhaps in an attempt to counter this trend, codification of the law of
war began to make meaningful advances in the mid-nineteenth century.
This codification included the 1863 Instructions for the Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field prepared by Francis Lieber
(hereinafter Lieber Code),24 the 1864 Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field25 with its
accompanying Additional Articles of 1868,26 the 1868 Declaration of St.
Petersburg,27 the unratified Brussels Conference of 1874,28 the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907,29 the 1906 Convention for the
21. Nathan A. Canestaro, "Small Wars" and the Law: Options for Prosecuting the Insurgents
in Iraq, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73, 82 (2004).
22. See id. at 83 (arguing that "the principle that the right to wage war is limited to sovereign
authority was asserted by the prominent Sixteenth Century legal scholar and father of
international law, Hugo Grotius..."). Canestaro gives an interesting and concise summary of the
historical beginnings of combatant status.
23. Id. at 84.
24. Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, U.S. War
Department, Adjutant General's Office, General Orders No. 100, Apr. 24, 1863 [hereinafter
Lieber Code], reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 14, at 3.
25. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 24, 1864, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra
note 14, at 279.
26. See Additional Articles (1868), reprinted in SCHINDLER& TOMAN, supra note 14, at 285.
27. Declaration of St. Petersburg (1868), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 14,
at 101.
28. Brussels Conference (1874), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 14, at 25.
29. Hague Conventions (1899 & 1907), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 14, at
215
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Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in
the Field,3" and the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War.31 This trend to codify the law of war included some
references to combatants, including defining what constituted a lawful
combatant.
While allowing for starvation of the general populace and the forced
return of civilians back into besieged cities, 32 the Lieber Code also
recognized the trend that "the inoffensive individual is as little disturbed
in his private relations as the commander of the hostile troops can afford
to grant in the overruling demands of a vigorous war."33 It also allowed
for summary treatment of persons who were taking part in hostilities but
not as part of the armed forces of the enemy state.3" While certainly not
the standards nations ascribe to today, these provisions became the basis
for further international law codifications.
Shortly after the Lieber Code, Czar Alexander II of Russia brought
together delegates from fifteen European nations who produced the
1874 Brussels Declaration.35 Though it was never ratified,36 it contained
a section on who should be recognized as combatants and
63-103.
30. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in
the Field (July 6, 1906), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 14, at 301.
31. 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929,
118 L.N.T.S. 343 (1929).
32. Lieber Code, supra note 24, arts. 17-18, at 6.
33. Id. art. 23, at 7; see also id. arts. 20-25, 37, at 6-9.
34. Lieber Code, supra note 24, art. 82. Article 82 states:
Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting, or inroads for
destruction or plunder, or by raids of any kind, without commission, without being part
and portion of the organized hostile army, and without sharing continuously in the war,
but who do so with intermitting returns to their homes and avocations, or with the
occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of
the character or appearance of soldiers-such men, or squads of men, are not public
enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war,
but shall be treated summarily as highway robbers or pirates.
Id.
35. Brussels Conference (1874), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 14, at 28.
36. See generally Jack S. Weiss, The Approval of Arms Control Agreements as
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1533 (1991) (highlighting the
Constitutional requirement for the President, after signing a treaty, to send it to the Senate for
advice and consent before it may come into effect). Many nations have the same requirements
and this is accounted for in international law. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23,
1969, arts. 11-15, 19, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also Jim Lobe, Bush 'Unsigns' War Crimes Treaty,
AlterNet, May 6, 2002, at http://www.altemet.org/story/13055/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2005)
(noting that though the United States signed the 1998 Rome Statute to establish an International
Criminal Court, it will not ratify it).
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noncombatants. This included article 9, the first codification of the oft-
quoted four criteria for combatants. Article 9 states:
The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies, but
also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following
conditions:
1. That they be commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
2. That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
distance;
3. That they carry arms openly; and
4. That they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
In countries where militia constitute the army, or form part of it,
they are included under the denomination "army.
37
This language is repeated again in article 1 of the Annex to the 1907
Hague Regulations38 and incorporated by direct reference in the 1929
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.39
The underlying assumption is that the regular armies of states have the
obligation to abide by the laws of war simply because they are acting
under the authority of the sovereign. Combatant immunity and other
combatant privileges stem from this same fact.4" Because other forces
like the militia and volunteer corps may not be led by the sovereign's
specific authority or may not be fighting under the sovereign's specific
orders, they only benefit from the privileges of combatants when acting
sufficiently like the sovereign's forces to be indistinguishable on the
battlefield.
Along with establishing some baseline rules on what constituted a
combatant and clarifying what standards had to be met to receive that
status, these early codifications also had the effect of dividing the
battlefield into two categories: combatants and noncombatants. This
bifurcation continues as a part of international law today, and is the
37. Brussels Conference (1874), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 14, at 28.
38. Hague Regulations Annex, art. 1 (1907), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note
14, at 75; see also Norman G. Printer, Jr., The Use of Force Against Non-State Actors under
International Law: An Analysis of the US. Predator Strike in Yemen, 8 UCLA J. INT'L L. &
FOREIGN AFF. 331, 363-65 (2003).
39. 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 3 1, at
343.
40. Canestaro, supra note 21, at 83.
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foundation of the formulation of the current understanding of combatant
status and its accompanying privileges.
41
1I. COMBATANT STATUS UNDER CURRENT INTERNATIONAL LAW
After World War II, the victorious nations convened at Geneva,
Switzerland, in an attempt to remedy some of the problems that
occurred during the war.42 These meetings resulted in the four Geneva
Conventions,43 addressing various aspects of persons on the battlefield.
The first three agreements built on prior Geneva Conventions, 44 the third
of which is the GPW, which built on the 1929 Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War45 and reconfirmed the principles
found in the earlier document. However, the fourth convention,
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War (GCC), 46 which outlined the protections of civilians on the
battlefield, was a clear recognition from the experiences of World War
II for the increasing need to protect noncombatants on the battlefield.47
These four conventions have become the definitive statement of
customary international law48 and are binding on all states.4 9
41. Maxwell, supra note 7, at 17-18.
42. See Mary Eileen E. McGrath, Contemporary International Legal Issues-Nuclear
Weapons: The Crisis of Conscience, 107 MIL. L. REV. 191, 209-12 (1985).
43. See Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, reprinted in
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 14, at 373; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 14, at 401; Convention (III) Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, reprinted
in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 14, at 423 [hereinafter GPW]; Convention (IV) Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S
287, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 14, at 495 [hereinafter GCC].
44. Joshua S. Clover, "Remember, We're the Good Guys ": The Classification and Trial of
the Guantanamo Bay Detainees, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 351, 358 (2004).
45. 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 31, at
343.
46. GCC, supra note 43, at 495.
47. See Kantwill & Watts, supra note 16, at 725; McGrath, supra note 42, at 209-10.
48. See, e.g., Marsha V. Mills, War Crimes in the 21st Century, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y
SYMP. 47, 50 (1999); see also GREEN H. HACKWORTH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1 DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 3, at 15-17 (1940) (outlining basic tenets of customary international law).
49. See HACKWORTH, supra note 48, § 1, at 2. The only country that has not ratified the 1949
Geneva Conventions is Nauru. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT 183 (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf/htmlall/section_
annual_report_2004 (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
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One of the principles underlying the Conventions was the idea that all
persons on the battlefield could be divided into one of two categories:
combatant or noncombatant.5" As Charlotte Liegl-Paul writes
concerning the current state of the law:
Whether on the battlefield voluntarily or involuntarily, each
person must have a classification in order to determine his or her
rights and responsibilities. Personnel on the battlefield are
classified as either combatants or noncombatants .... Combatants
have the right to participate directly in hostilities; all others must
refrain from participating in the hostilities. Civilians acting
inconsistent with their noncombatant status risk losing the
protections of this status.5'
Within the Conventions, the GPW addresses combatants while
noncombatants are discussed in the GCC. Though noncombatants are
not defined,52 article 4 of the GPW defines who will receive combatant
status. It is this standard that has recently been the subject of widespread
scrutiny.53
50. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 3
74-87 (July 8, 1996) available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/ iunanframe.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2005) ("The cardinal principles contained in the texts constituting the fabric
of humanitarian law are the following. The first is aimed at the protection of the civilian
population and civilian objects and establishes the distinction between combatants and non-
combatants." 78); Orma Ben-Naftali & Sean S. Gleichgevitch, Missing in Legal Action:
Lebanese Hostages in Israel, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 243-44 (2000).
51. Charlotte M. Liegl-Paul, Civilian Prisoners of War: A Proposed Citizen Code of Conduct,
182 MIL. L. REv. 106, 113 (2004) (citations omitted).
52. The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, Dec. 12, 1977, art. 50, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3, tries to solve this problem in article 50, which states:
Article 50-Definition of civilians and civilian population
1. A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons
referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in Article 43
of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be
considered to be a civilian.
2. The civilian population comprises all persons who are civilians.
3. The presence within the civilian population of individuals who do not come within
the definition of civilians does not deprive the population of its civilian character.
This does not do much to clarify the issues since it just falls back on the language of the prior
Convention. It does, however, reiterate that there are only two legal statuses for persons on the
battlefield.
53. See, e.g., Jennifer Elsea, Treatment of "Battlefield Detainees" in the War on Terrorism,
Cong. Res. Serv. Pol'y Paper, Dec. 8, 2003, available at LEXIS, News File.
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A. Analysis ofArticle 4 of the GPW
The GPW starts off with an introductory paragraph, followed by
articles 2" and 3,55 which are common to all four Geneva Conventions
and deal with applicability of the Conventions. The next article, article
4, discusses the issue of combatant status and addresses who is covered
by its provisions. It states, in pertinent part:
A. Prisoners of War, in the sense of the present Convention, are
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have
fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as
well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part
of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided
that such militias or volunteer corps, including such
organized resistance movements, fulfill the following
conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates;
54. Article 2 defines the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and is common to all four
Conventions to ensure that they apply to the same situations. Article 2 specifically states that the
Conventions apply to international armed conflict or conflict "between two or more of the High
Contracting Parties [to the Geneva Conventions], even if the state of war is not recognized by one
of them" and to states of "occupation." See GPW, supra note 43, reprinted in SCHINDLER &
TOMAN, supra note 14, at 429-30. The full body of the law of war applies to common article 2
conflicts, including the provisions of the Geneva Conventions. International & Operational Law
Department, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, U.S. Army, OPERATIONAL
LAW HANDBOOK 12, 15 (Derek I. Grimes ed., 2005).
55. In contrast to article 2 conflicts, article 3 deals with "armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties." See Convention (1) for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, supra
note 43, art. 2; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, supra note 43, art. 2; GPW, supra note 43, art. 2;
and Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note
43, art 2. A much smaller and less encompassing set of rights applies to individuals participating
in common article 3 conflicts. For a discussion on the differences between common articles 2 and
3, see W. Michael Reisman and James Silk, Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict?, 82 AM.
J. INT'L L. 459 (1988); Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 239, 260 (2000). These rights do not include combatant immunity.
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(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with
the laws and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance
to a government or an authority not recognized by the
Detaining Power.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the
approach of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist
th i.nading f, rcn, without havin2 had time to form
themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms
openly and respect the laws of war. 56
It is important to note that the 1949 Conventions were written largely
in response to the experiences of World War II. Given the partisan
operations during that conflict, deciding how to treat such forces was
certainly part of the negotiating process. The state representatives each
came with different ideas based on their experience from the war, some
of whom had supported large numbers of partisans and other irregular
forces." Article 4 attempted to deal with the issues of partisans and
others who might participate on the battlefield and deserve protection.58
For example, the issue of extending combatant status to those
participating in civil wars was also debated at the Diplomatic
Conference of 1949. The delegates decided against it because they did
not want to grant combatant protections to groups fighting against their
own government.59 Combatant status was too valuable a privilege to
56. GPW, supra note 43, art. 4.
57. See COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR 52-53 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958); Aldrich, supra note 16, at 44.
58. But see Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 367,
374 (2004) ("It is well understood in humanitarian law circles that the 1949 Geneva Conventions
did little to resolve the long-standing dispute over whether and when irregular forces should
qualify for lawful combatant status.").
59. Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal
Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 19-20 (2004). Article 3, dealing with
noninternational armed conflicts, specifically does not grant combatant immunity, regardless of
compliance with the four criteria of article 4. See Jinks, supra note 58, at 404-05 ("States
supported this language [of Article 3] so that members of an irregular armed group could be
subjected to domestic criminal prosecution for their very participation in the hostilities even if
conducted in accordance with the laws of war.").
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distribute to all fighting forces. This special status was to be reserved
for a select few who clearly distinguished themselves as lawful
battlefield fighters.
Since the events of September 11, 2001, and the United States'
resulting detention of "unlawful combatants" 6° in Guantanamo, there
has been an ongoing debate concerning the definition of a combatant
and who qualifies for combatant status. In its simplest form, the
question is whether the four criteria in paragraph 4A(2) apply to the
regular armed forces mentioned in 4A(1) and (3).61 Though it is not
resolved under international law,62 the United States has taken a clear
stand on this issue.63 For the purposes of this Article, the resolution of
this question is unimportant. It suffices to say that for those who are
most contentious on the battlefield, meaning those who are not the
regular forces of their nation state, compliance with the four criteria are
required to receive the benefits of combatant status.
A further point of importance from article 4 is that these provisions
provide an all-or-nothing test. As Professor Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks
states, "one's status as a 'lawful combatant' under the Geneva
Conventions hinges, as a threshold matter, not on one's substantive
actions but on certain questions of form: whether one is under
responsible command, whether one 'wears a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance,' and whether one carries arms openly., 64
Further, these conditions are conjunctive, meaning that an individual
must comply with all of them, or no status and no privileges are granted.
As the United States argued in relation to the Taliban, their open
noncompliance with the laws of war disqualified them from the
privileges of combatant status despite their potential compliance with
other criteria.65
60. See Printer, supra note 38, at 363-69 (defining combatants, noncombatants, and unlawful
combatants).
61. See Berman, supra note 59, at 41-43 (2004) for an efficient encapsulation of the
arguments on both sides.
62. See Leon Friedman, U.S. is Violating Accord on POWs, NEWSDAY, Jan. 26, 2004.
63. See John C. Yoo & James C. Ho, The Status of Terrorists, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 207, 225
(2003).
64. Brooks, supra note 3, at 706.
65. Joseph P. Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees, Unlawful
Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1, 30-34 (2004). But
see Steven W. Becker, "Mirror, Mirror on the Wall... ": Assessing the Aftermath of September
lth, 37 VAL. U.L. REV. 563, 571-75 (2003) (arguing that the Taliban deserved combatant status
based on article 4 of the GPW).
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The United States advocates against the Taliban and others who fail
to comply with the article receiving combatant status because the status
is associated with a number of privileges that are further outlined in the
Convention. The most important benefit is combatant immunity; there
are others of great value as well, such as repatriation after the war;66
specific limitation on living conditions;67  work requirements;"
correspondence and relief packages; 69 and limitation on disciplinary and
judicial proceedings.7"
Professor Jinks has recently argued that these privileges attending
combatant status are not significantly more extensive than those
privileges offered to civilians in the GCC.71 However, the one major
exception to this is the lack of criminal sanction for normally illegal acts
such as killing and destruction of property granted to combatants. Even
Jinks agrees that "[lln the end, tie unique piotectivw g nif'" : . .
POW status is combatant immunity."72 This blanket immunity for
warlike acts that fit within the law of armed conflict turns a murderer
into a soldier doing his duty to his sovereign. It is this immunity that the
United States refuses to grant to al Qaeda and the Taliban,73 despite
66. GPW, supra note 43, art. 118.
67. Id. arts. 22-25.
68. Id. arts. 49-57.
69. Id. arts. 71-77.
70. Id. arts. 82-108.
71. Jinks, supra note 58, at 380. Also see the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 43, where article 6 discusses the end of the
application of the Convention at the end of hostilities or one year after in the case of occupation,
articles 83-94 deal with internment camps, articles 95-96 deal with internee labor, articles 107-
113 cover correspondence, articles 64-75 discuss disciplinary and judicial proceedings for the
population as a whole, and articles 117-26 deal with disciplinary and judicial proceedings or
internees. See also Gabor Rona, War, International Law, and Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules
of the Game in a New Century: Legal Frameworks to Combat Terrorists: An Abundant Inventory
of Existing Tools, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 499, 504 (2005) (noting that the United States' position
would afford enemy combatants neither GPW privileges nor GCC privileges but would leave
them in a "legal black hole."); Kantwill & Watts, supra note 16, at 687-708.
72. Jinks, supra note 58, at 436; see also Derek Jinks, The Changing Laws of War: Do We
Need a New Legal Regime After September 11?: Protective Parity and the Laws of War, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1493, 1520 (2004); LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, Implementation of
International Humanitarian Law in Future Wars, in 71 THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO
THE NEW MILLENNIUM 55 (Naval War College International Law Studies) (Michael N. Schmitt
& Leslie C. Green eds., 1998).
73. The United States recently published Joint Publication 3-63, Joint Doctrine for Detainee
Operations, where it states that enemy combatants "are not granted or entitled to the privileges of
the Geneva Convention." THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB 3-63, JOINT DOCTRINE FOR
DETAINEE OPERATIONS I-1 (Final Coordinating Draft, Mar. 23, 2005), available at
http://cryptome.org/joint/joint-pubs.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2005); see also Jim Mannion,
Rights Group Decries Proposed Military Doctrine that Formalizes "Enemy Combatants" Status,
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reasonable arguments to do so. The United States believes that it would
not only cloak calculated murder in legitimacy, but also derogate the
protections given noncombatants.74
B. Protections for Noncombatants
The primary reason for insisting on the criteria for combatant status is
to allow for distinction on the battlefield.75 As Lieutenant Colonel
Joseph Bialke states:
Armed conflict places large numbers of civilians on all sides of a
conflict in grave situations where the risks of death, suffering,
loss, and other depredations are extremely high. This is
especially so when combatants disguise themselves as protected
noncombatant civilians. [The law of armed conflict] has long
been designed to mitigate the risks to civilians by clearly
distinguishing lawful combatants from unlawful combatants. 76
In the absence of this ability to distinguish combatants from
noncombatants, soldiers on the battlefield are left in the unsatisfactory
situation mentioned in the quotes beginning this Article. They must
decide either not to shoot those who appear to be noncombatants and
risk being killed, or attempt to distinguish between combatants and
noncombatants, and in doing so, knowingly accept the risk of killing
noncombatants for self-preservation.
7
Distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants is generally
done by requiring combatants78 to wear uniforms. 79 The purpose of the
Agence France Presse, Apr. 8, 2005.
74. Bialke, supra note 65, at 84.
75. See Jinks, supra note 72, at 1497, which states:
Noncombatants are granted immunity from attack so long as they do not participate
directly in hostilities. In this sense, the protection of noncombatants from attack is
predicated on a clear distinction between combatants and noncombatants. If attacking
forces cannot distinguish between enemy soldiers and civilians, this type of rule cannot
work well....It is the goal of protecting innocent civilians that requires a sharp line
between combatants and noncombatants.
76. Bialke, supra note 76, at 7.
77. See Maxwell, supra note 7, at 23 ("Absent this ability to distinguish between lawful and
unlawful combatants, an enemy might well be left with one of two targeting choices: do not
engage any civilians, even though some are engaging its forces, or engage every enemy civilian
on the battlefield. The latter choice will likely prevail.").
78. A significant issue in recent wars is the expansive use of civilian employees and
contractors to support the force. The obvious challenge for nations like the United States which
extensively use civilians in combat is to retain the legal protections for noncombatants in a way to
allow these essential civilian contractors on the battlefield. See Liegl-Paul, supra note 51, at 108
("The [U.S. Department of Defense] employs civilians in a variety of roles in [Iraq and
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uniform requirement is to allow other combatants to know who to target
and who not to target,80 thereby protecting noncombatants." The
advantages to the fixed distinctive sign are obvious. A person's outward
appearance provides no information about whether the person is likely
to comply with the laws of war or is commanded by a reasonable entity.
Furthermore, because of the general lack of safety in war-tom areas,
many civilians carry weapons for protection.8 2 Of the four article 4
Afghanistan]. Department of Defense civilians and contractors, at times, work side by side with
uniformed personnel." (citations omitted)). Prior to Operation Enduring Freedom, both the Army
and Air Force issued guidance that contractors should not wear military uniforms. Michael
Guillory states:
Initially, both the Army and the Air Force indicated that contractors should not wear
military uniforms. "Contractors accompanying the force are not authorized to wear
uniforms, except for specific items required for safety or security, such as: chemical
defense equipment, cold weather equipment, or mission specific safety equipment." On
February 8, 2001, the Acting Secretary of the Air Force issued a similar admonition but
the prohibitions are not ironclad: "If required by the Theater commander, the
deployment processing center will issue Organizational Clothing and Individual
Equipment to contractor personnel. The wearing of such equipment by contractor
personnel, however, is voluntary." "Exceptions may be made for compelling
reasons.... Should commanders issue any type of standard uniform item to contractors
[sic] personnel, care must be taken to require that the contractor personnel be
distinguishable from military personnel through the use of some distinctively colored
patches, armbands, or headgear."
Guillory, supra note 7, at 128-29; see also Michael N. Schmitt, War, International Law, and
Sovereignty: Reevaluating the Rules of the Game in a New Century: Humanitarian Law and
Direct Participation in Hostilities by Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 511 (2005) (providing an excellent analysis of the status of civilian contractors and employees
in armed conflict).
79. Bialke, supra note 65, at 13 ("LOAC [the law of armed conflict] seeks to protect civilian
populations by proscribing conduct that endangers such populations unreasonably, such as taking
part in combat without wearing a distinctive uniform or other form of identification that is clear
and visible at a distance.").
80. Berman, supra note 59, at 43.
81. Guillory, supra note 7, at 133.
82. See Guillory, supra note 7, at 129-30 (quoting U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD
MANUAL 100-21, CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD, 1-8 (2000)):
The general policy of the Army is that contractor personnel will not be armed.
However, under certain conditions.. .they may be allowed to do so. The decision to
allow contractor personnel to carry and use weapons for personal protection rests with
the CINC. Once the CINC has approved their issue and use, the contractor's company
policy must permit the use of weapons by its employees; and, the employee must agree
to carry a weapon. When all of these conditions have been met, contractor personnel
may only be issued military specification sidearms, loaded with military specification
ammunition, by the military. Additionally, contractor personnel must be specifically
trained and familiarized with the weapon, and trained in the use of deadly force in order
to protect themselves. Contractor personnel will not possess privately owned weapons.
See also Guillory, supra note 7, at 129-30 (quoting Lawrence J. Delaney, Interim Policy
Memorandum-Contractors in the Theater (8 Feb. 2001)):
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criteria, this leaves the fixed distinctive sign as clearly the best way to
distinguish between combatants and noncombatants. Though other
"distinctive sign[s] recognizable at a distance" have been used,83 "the
use of a uniform or distinctive sign is the most basic of the four indicia
of lawful belligerency"84 and remains the most effective means for
distinguishing between combatants and noncombatants.
The goal of international law, given its desire to protect
noncombatants during armed conflict, ought to be to ensure all
battlefield fighters distinguish themselves by wearing a uniform.
Unfortunately, the international community seems to be moving in the
opposite direction.
C. GPIArguments
Despite the value of uniforms in preserving the principle of
distinction, the international community decided to devalue the
requirement for a fixed distinctive sign in Protocol I to the Geneva
Conventions (GPI). 5 This Protocol was written in response to the
experiences of the Vietnam War86 and specifically relaxed the
requirements for combatant status. Articles 43 and 44 state, in pertinent
part:
Article 43. Armed forces
1. The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all
organized armed forces, groups and units which are under a
command responsible to that Party for the conduct or its
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or
an authority not recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed
forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which,
Air Force commanders should not issue firearms to contractor personnel operating on
their installations, nor should they allow contractor personnel to carry personally owned
weapons. With the express permission of the geographic C1NC and in consultation with
host nation authorities, Air Force commanders may deviate from this prohibition of
firearms only in the most unusual of circumstances (e.g., for protection from bandits or
dangerous animals if no military personnel are present to provide protection).
83. Hays Parks, Special Forces' Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 493, 523
(2003); see also id. (describing the Northern Alliance fighters in Afghanistan distinguishing
themselves by the wear of a hat or tribal scarf.)
84. Bialke, supra note 65, at 24-25.
85. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) [hereinafter GPI], opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391.
86. See Theodor Meron, The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva Protocol
1, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 678, 679 (1994).
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inter alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules of international
law applicable in armed conflict.
Article 44. Combatants and prisoners of war
3. In order to promote the protection of the civilian population
from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they
are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to
an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in
armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an
armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain
his status as a combatant, provided .at, in . such situains he
carries his arms openly:
(a) during each military engagement, and
(b) during such time as he is visible to the adversary while he is
engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of an
attack in which he is to participate.
Acts which comply with the requirements of this paragraph shall
not be considered as perfidious within the meaning of Article 37,
paragraph 1 (c).
5. Any combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party
while not engaged in an attack or in a military operation
preparatory to an attack shall not forfeit his rights to be a
combatant and a prisoner of war by virtue of his prior activities.
7. This Article is not intended to change the generally accepted
practice of States with respect to the wearing of the uniform by
combatants assigned to the regular, uniformed armed units of a
Party to the conflict.87
87. GPI, supra note 85. The remainder of the provisions in these two articles are also important
and have bearing on this problem:
Article 43
2. Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict (other than medical personnel
and chaplains covered by Article 33 of the Third Convention) are combatants, that is to
say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.
3. Whenever a Party to a conflict incorporates a paramilitary or armed law
enforcement agency into its armed forces it shall so notify the other Parties to the
conflict.
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These provisions are highly controversial.8" The United States signed
but did not ratify the GPI because, although it accepts much of the GPI
as customary international law, 9 it specifically objects to articles 43 and
44.9 In fact, President Reagan made those objections explicit in his
letter of Transmittal to the Senate concerning their advice and consent.91
Article 44(3) changes the traditional requirements of article 4 of the
GPW by not requiring the uniform when, "owing to the nature of the
hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself."92 This
derogation from the traditional standard "has been construed to overly
broaden the category of lawful combatants to include un-uniformed
guerrillas, insurgents and similar groups. This dramatically lowers the
Article 44
1. Any combatant, as defined in Article 43, who falls into the power of an adverse
Party shall be a prisoner of war.
2. While all combatants are obliged to comply with the rules of international law
applicable in armed conflict, violations of these rules shall not deprive a combatant of
his right to be a combatant or, if he falls into the power of an adverse Party, of his right
to be a prisoner of war, except as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4.
4. A combatant who falls into the power of an adverse Party while failing to meet the
requirements set forth in the second sentence of paragraph 3 shall forfeit his right to be a
prisoner of war, but he shall, nevertheless, be given protections equivalent in all respects
to those accorded to prisoners of war by the Third Convention and by this Protocol. This
protection includes protections equivalent to those accorded to prisoners of war by the
Third Convention in the case where such a person is tried and punished for any offences
he has committed.
6. This Article is without prejudice to the right of any person to be a prisoner of war
pursuant to Article 4 of the Third Convention.
8. In addition to the categories of persons mentioned in Article 13 of the First and
Second Conventions, all members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as
defined in Article 43 of this Protocol, shall be entitled to protection under those
Conventions if they are wounded or sick or, in the case of the Second Convention,
shipwrecked at sea or in other waters.
Id
88. See Aldrich, supra note 16, at 45-48. Mr. Aldrich was a part of the U.S. delegation to
Protocol I and provides an interesting analysis of some of these provisions, while noting that they
were controversial and caused much consternation and debate amongst the parties.
89. See Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary Law
to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
419 (1987) (discussing which articles of the GPI the United States believes are customary
international law and to which the United States objects).
90. See Yoo & Ho, supra note 63, at 226-28; Matheson, supra note 89, at 425-26
(specifically detailing the United States' view on articles 43 and 44).
91. See Message of President Ronald Reagan to United States Senate, Jan. 29, 1987, reprinted
in 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 910 (1987).
92. GPI, supra note 85, art. 44(3).
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standard of a combatant's requirements of lawful belligerency and POW
status, significantly diminishes combatant/noncombatant distinctions,
and hence substantially endangers noncombatant civilians."93 Part of the
reason combatants are given special privileges is because they
distinguish themselves from the civilian population,94 and by so doing,
hold themselves out as targets to lawful and unlawful combatants
alike.95 Article 44(7) creates a "bias against regular armed forces"
because it leaves their responsibilities and requirements intact while
article 44(3) excuses others from keeping them.96
As one of the sponsors of the Protocol, the ICRC compiled a
commentary on the proceedings.97  Concerning article 43, the
Commentary states that "[i]t does not allow this combatant to have the
status of a combatant while he is in action, and the status of a civilian at
other times. It does not recognize combatant status strike as on
demand."' 98 It then adds that this language is designed to put "all
combatants on an equal legal footing." 99 However, in the next
paragraph, the commentary admits that "[a]n effective distinction
between combatants and non-combatants may be more difficult as a
result, but not to the point of becoming impossible.""1 °
The approach of the GPI is counterproductive. Rather than attempt to
give battlefield fighters an incentive to strive for complete compliance,
GPI lowers the requirements for combatant status to bring more people
within the ambit of the Convention's coverage. This approach does not
support the overall idea of "promoting the protection of the civilian
population from the effects of hostilities"'' because it tries to solve the
93. Bialke, supra note 65, at 29.
94. See Jinks, supra note 72, at 1513 (arguing that the protections coming from Geneva Law
are based on the assumption that all human beings deserved to be treated humanely and,
therefore, unlawful combatants should be eligible for that same treatment. The difference in the
case of privileges other than medical care, such as targeting issues and combatant immunity, is
that by wearing uniforms, members of the military publicly make themselves targets, something
unlawful combatants are not willing to do).
95. Cf Ferrell, supra note 15, at 105 (arguing that some special operations missions in
civilian clothes may result in the loss of combatant status or a charge of perfidy); W. Hays Parks,
supra note 83, at 497 (arguing that it is permissible to dress in "non-standard" uniforms to "lower
the visibility of U.S. forces").
96. Berman, supra note 59, at 47-49; Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., Double-Red-
Crossed, NAT'L INTEREST, Spring 2005, at 66-67.
97. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 1949 (S. Pictet et al. eds., 1958).
98. Id. 1678.
99. Id.
100. Id. 1679.
101. GPI, supra note 85, art. 43(3).
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problem of combatant status by relaxing the standards, giving insurgents
a disincentive to distinguish themselves. Article 44(3)'s allowance for
part-time combatants who "distinguish themselves from the civilian
population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation
preparatory to an attack"' 2 may be an attempt to encourage those who
otherwise would not distinguish themselves to do so. The exception
allowed when "an armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself,"'
10 3
however, not only destroys the utility of the article but is a fatal flaw to
the document.l
0 4
GPI's derogation of the standards required to achieve combatant
status, if accepted by the international community as a whole, would
risk the safety of civilians. It is self-evident that "[n]oncombatants are
most at risk when combatants hide amongst them, wearing civilian
clothes and using civilians as human shields. There are good reasons to
think that many fighters will continue to engage in this dangerous
subterfuge."' °5
George Aldrich, head of the U.S. delegation to the Geneva
Conference that signed the GPI,"' wrote in 2000: "Whether or not these
new rules offer enough incentive to induce resistance groups to comply
can, of course, be determined only in practice."'0 7 The recent conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate current practice and provide a clear
example of why GPI's relaxation of the uniform standard is the wrong
approach to encouraging the protection of civilians and why
intermediate levels of recognition for those who wear fixed distinctive
signs is so needed. The Taliban example illustrates this point. The Bush
administration decided that the Taliban and al Qaeda would not receive
combatant status.'8 Many have argued the United States was justified in
its treatment of the Taliban and al Qaeda. °9 The President recognized
102. Id. art. 44(3).
103. Id.
104. See Aldrich, supra note 16, at 47 (explaining the intended interpretation of the language
in article 44(3)).
105. Callen, supra note 2, at 1072; Berman, supra note 59, at 50.
106. See Aldrich, supra note 16, at 46.
107. See id. at 48.
108. See White House Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005);
Brooks, supra note 3, at 732-33; see also David A. Martin, Immigration Law and Human Rights:
Legal Line Drawing Post-September 11: Symposium Article: Offshore Detainees and the Role of
Courts after Rasul v. Bush: The Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 1 (2005) (discussing the Guantanamo detainee cases in the United States federal
court system).
109. Bialke, supra note 65, at 2; Casey & Rivkin, Jr., supra note 96, at 63.
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the Taliban as the regular forces of Afghanistan but made the decision
not to grant them combatant status because of their lack of compliance
with the law of war. 1 ° Given this decision, the Taliban have no
continuing incentive to distinguish themselves from the civilian
populace. "
Consider the consequences if the Taliban had anticipated that they
would not be given combatant status, faded into the civilian populace,
and fought from a position of anonymity as the terrorists have done in
Iraq. There is no doubt this strategic maneuver would have resulted in
more civilian and coalition force deaths. Yet what incentive did the
Taliban have to do otherwise? Because of the current all-or-nothing
approach to combatant status, the Taliban is faced with only
disincentives to distinguish themselves.
Conversely, the laws of armed conflict, particularly those dealing
with combatants, have been challenged by asymmetric opponents like al
Qaeda and Fedayeen.112 Though the Fedayeen have been distinguishable
on certain occasions,1 3 they and other groups such as Mahdi's Militia
have fought in civilian clothes from within civilian formations.1 4 It is
unlikely that providing intermediate levels of recognition to al Qaeda
will change its tactics,115 but it may affect groups like the Fedayeen and
Mahdi's Militia who otherwise would not get any of the privileges of
combatant status. Granting them limited privileges in exchange for the
ability to better distinguish noncombatants would be a significant step
toward attaining the overall international law goal of providing greater
protections to noncombatants.
110. Bialke, supra note 65, at 16.
111. See Department of Defense News Briefing Part 1 of 2, M2 Presswire, Feb. 11, 2002,
available at LEXIS, News File. But see The Osgood File: US. Troops Find Weapons in Afghan
Caves and Believe Hundreds of Taliban Fighters Still Remaining (CBS television broadcast Mar.
6, 2002), transcript available at LEXIS, News File.
112. Michael Sirak, Legal Armed Conflict, JANE'S DEFENCE WEEKLY, Jan. 14, 2004, at 25.
113. See After Attack, S. Korean Engineers Quit Iraq, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 2003, available
at LEXIS, News File; US.-Iraq: A Sunday in Samarra Analysis, IPS-Inter Press Serv., Dec. 6,
2003, available at LEXIS, News File. But see Commanders Relate Lessons Learned in Iraq, U.S.
FED. NEWS, Oct. 29, 2004, available at LEXIS, News File.
114. Insight: Interview with Thomas Friedman (CNN INTERNATIONAL, Apr. 1, 2004),
transcript available at LEXIS, News File.
115. Aldrich, supra note 16, at 44-45.
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III. EVOLVE THE LAW TO ALLOW INTERMEDIATE LEVELS OF
RECOGNITION FOR PARTIAL COMPLIANCE
A sound approach is to evolve the law to allow for intermediate
levels of recognition for partial compliance with the requirements
clearly identified in article 4 of the GPW, particularly that of wearing a
fixed distinctive emblem, or uniform. The benefit of this approach is
that it would not lower the standard for full combatant status, thereby
leaving incentives in place to completely comply, but it would provide
intermediate incentives to encourage groups to do all they could to
distinguish themselves from the populace, thereby preserving
protections for noncombatants.
The combatant status determination system is outdated in today's
world situation116 and alternatives need to be found. Derek Jinks states
that "[c]riminalization of belligerency creates perverse incentives for the
unlawful combatants: because their very participation in the hostilities
subjects them to criminal prosecution upon capture, they have no
incentive to comply with the law of war."'117 The all-or-nothing nature of
combatant status leaves those who cannot comply with little incentive to
even try. Therefore, "[t]he denial of combatants' privilege to some
combatants does not mean that they will not engage in combat. One
may even speculate as to whether those fighting without the privilege
may do so with a special ferocity, precisely because the stakes are so
high."1 1
8
Once they have made the decision to fight outside of complete
compliance, unlawful fighters know that they will receive no benefits
and will be quickly tried as murderers in domestic courts or military
tribunals. This motivation exists because the current system is organized
with only negative incentives to comply with combatant status unless
one can meet all four criteria of GPW. 19
116. Brooks, supra note 3, at 734, 756-57:
It should be noted that the rules for determining the lawfulness or unlawfulness of a
combatant are themselves archaic and arguably biased in favor of wealthier armies. The
notion that "lawfulness" might hinge, for instance, on the wearing of "fixed distinctive
signs" is odd; again, the classic paradigm, with its images of bugles and banners, does
not accord well with the realities of modem conflicts, in which the rag-tag soldiers of
third-world states and militias may simply lack the resources to wear anything
resembling a uniform. Here, the law of armed conflict offers a set of chivalric rules that
favors those with more resources.
(citations omitted).
117. Jinks, supra note 58, at 438; Jinks, supra note 72, at 1523.
118. Berman, supra note 59, at 12.
119. Callen, supra note 2, at 1026-28, 1063-64.
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Jinks has recently written two thought-provoking articles on this
issue. Jinks agrees that "the question is how best to encourage fighters
to distinguish themselves from the civilian population."' 2 ° He argues
that "protective status categories are an inefficient way to incentivize
individual combatants because these categories necessarily trade on
collective considerations-such as the organizational characteristics of
the fighting force."'' In other words, the four criteria for combatant
status are too dependent upon a structural view of the person on the
battlefield. There is no way for an individual actor to gain combatant
status. He then proposes that "[t]he rule of distinction would be better
served by an individual 'war crimes' approach that accorded all fighters
substantial humanitarian protection and punished (in accord with basic
requirements of due process) individual bad actors." '
There is no doubt that Jinks is correct in his analysis concerning the
need to give positive incentives to fighters. However, this solution fails
to view the problem from the perspective of a soldier on the ground
trying to distinguish between persons dressed in civilian clothes,
knowing that only some of whom are unlawful combatants. The fact
that all who commit war crimes will be prosecuted, whether lawful or
unlawful combatants, will only deter those unlawful combatants who
are concerned about war crimes prosecutions. Jinks' solution also does
not address the fact that this deterrence by prosecution approach may
only, as mentioned above, increase the ferocity and frequency with
which the fighter uses civilians in his fight.'23 Jinks offers only negative
incentives, no carrots to counterbalance the sticks,"2 4 and argues that the
Geneva Conventions are specifically organized in that way.2 5
The ultimate solution may include parts of Jinks' proposal, but there
must also be some "carrot-type" incentives to encourage the unlawful
combatant to distinguish himself and, therefore, make himself a target
(thus protecting the noncombatant population).'26 Jason Callen agrees
120. Jinks, supra note 72, at 1495.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See supra note 111.
124. Jinks, supra note 58, at 441.
125. Jinks, supra note 72, at 1524-25.
126. The International Committee of the Red Cross does not believe that any change is
necessary despite the clear noncompliance and its resulting risks to noncombatants. See Balthasar
Staehelin and John Hutson Discuss the Idea of Possibly Changing the Geneva Conventions to
Reflect a More Modem View of Warfare (NPR broadcast Nov. 28, 2004), transcript available at
LEXIS, News File. (Mr. Staehelin, the Director for the International Committee of the Red Cross
Operations for the Middle East and North Africa, states: "I think that the Geneva Conventions
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and explains that "[t]he best way to protect civilians is to create the
strongest incentives for combatants to distinguish themselves from the
rest of the population." 127 Callen believes that the Conventions currently
do this through rewarding only compliance; the incentive of combatant
immunity should be sufficient. However, as the quotations at the
beginning of the article and the continuing experience in Iraq 128 clearly
portray, the incentives are currently not strong enough to provide for the
desired safety of noncombatants.
Combatant immunity is a great carrot, or incentive, and ought to be
used as such 129 in an attempt to bring battlefield fighters into complete
compliance. Further, it is clear that partial compliance does not merit
complete privilege. Unlawful battlefield combatants ought not to benefit
completely from rules with which they do not comply. 3 ° But there are
certainly intermediate protections and benefits that can be offered to
those irregular armed forces to help encourage them to distinguish
themselves from the general populace and give soldiers and other lawful
battlefield participants a greater opportunity to apply the principle of
distinction clearly.
These protections and benefits could include immunity from
prosecution for speech or association crimes connected with political
beliefs; abeyance of execution of punishment until conflict is resolved;
offer of parole, including immunity for weapons crimes not resulting in
death or injury; compliance with international law as a mitigating factor
at sentencing; disallowance of the death penalty; and if the movement
which the fighter is a part of eventually achieves combatant status, the
fighter's prior lawful warlike actions may also be covered by combatant
immunity.
provide very good answers to the problems we have today. If they were respected, I think we
would have a totally different situation. So, in our view, the most important issue today is respect
for these conventions and not for revisions."); see also Gabor Rona, supra note 71, at 499
("While there will always be room for tinkering around the margins of any legal framework, the
implication that a new one needs to be developed specifically to combat terrorism is doubtful.").
127. Callen, supra note 2, at 1072.
128. See Dilanian, supra note 8 ("The inability to separate the good guys from the bad is the
central dilemma that has bedeviled American soldiers in Iraq for nearly two years as they have
tried to root out an unknown number of insurgents who wreak havoc and then blend into the
civilian population.").
129. Jinks, supra note 58, at 438.
130. See 2 FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA OF 1949, A, 621
(1949) cited in Callen, supra note 2, at 1051.
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IV. SPECIFIC PROVISIONS
In enumerating specific proposed incentives to encourage all
battlefield fighters to distinguish themselves from the local populace, it
is important to ensure that these privileges are not already granted to the
class of people targeted for change. Since the armed conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq, there has been lively discussion on what
privileges actually accrue to "unlawful combatants." As previously
mentioned, some believe that unlawful combatants are already covered
by the GCC and that those benefits closely approximate the privileges
accorded prisoners of war in the GPW. This argument is cogently stated
by Jinks who writes that "[t]he Geneva Conventions protect unlawful
combatants, and this protection very closely approximates that accorded
POWs."'' He concludes his article:
What difference does POW status make? Contrary to
conventional wisdom (and the prevailing policy debates in the
current "war on terrorism"), I maintain that POW status carries
no significant, unique protective consequences. As a descriptive
matter, the unique protective significance of POW status is
minimal and in sharp decline. The text, structure, and history of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols
thereto strongly support this conclusion. 32
On the other hand, the traditional approach has been to argue that
unlawful combatants receive neither the protections of the GPW or the
GCC. Jason Callen endorses this position when he writes that the "text
of the Civilian Convention, together with the Convention's legislative
history, shows that battlefield unlawful combatants are not among the
unlawful combatants covered by the Conventions."'33 As opposed to the
ICRC commentary that Jinks uses to support his argument, 3 4 Callen
131. Jinks,supra note 58, at 440.
132. Id. at 442.
133. Callen, supra note 2, at 1031.
134. See id. Callen writes:
Scholars who argue that the Civilian convention protects all types of unlawful
combatants rely on the International Committee of the Red Cross's Commentary to the
Geneva Conventions. The Commentary provides background on the negotiations that
occurred during the drafting of each Convention and offers the ICRC's interpretation of
the meaning of the respective Convention's Articles. While the ICRC Commentary
suggests that the Civilian Convention was intended to cover all unlawful combatants,
the commentary does not persuasively show that this is what the Conventions' authors
intended.
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looks to prior conferences and the Final Record of the Geneva
Conference... for his support.
The resolution of this argument is significant because if unlawful
combatants are covered by the GCC as Jinks argues, some of the
proposals below will represent less meaningful incentives. However, the
fact that the discussion is ongoing and that Callen adopts the traditional
approach make the suggestion of incentives important. Further, state
practice, at least among coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, has
been not to apply GCC privileges to unlawful combatants as a matter of
law, though U.S. forces have provided many privileges as a matter of
policy. 136
A. Immunity from Speech or Association Crimes Connected with
Political Beliefs
The first incentive that should be offered to battlefield fighters who
choose to distinguish themselves by wearing uniforms is immunity from
prosecution for treasonous or inciting speech or associating with others
who are involved in the armed conflict. These individuals could still be
detained and held until they no longer represented a risk or the
termination of the conflict,' but if prosecution was contemplated, the
detainees would be immune from prosecution for their speech or
associations. Such an incentive may have been useful, for example, in
Baghdad in April 2004.
At that time, members of Mahdi's Militia were engaging in open
hostilities against the occupying coalition forces.' Some wore uniforms
and others did not.'39 These battlefield fighters did not qualify for
Id. (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 1029.
136. See Department of Defense Directive 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program (Dec. 9,
1998), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf2/d510077p.pdf (last visited Oct.
1, 2005):
5.3. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
5.3.1. Ensure that the members of their DoD Components comply with the law of
war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and with the
principles and spirit of the law of war during all other operations.
Id.; Gregory P. Noone et al., Prisoners of War in the 21st Century: Issues in Modern Warfare, 50
NAVAL L. REV. 1, 17 (2004).
137. Jordan J. Paust, Current Pressures on International Humanitarian Law: War and Enemy
Status after 9/11: Attacks on the Law of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325, 328-29 (2003).
138. Bill Powell et al., An Eruption of Iraqi Insurgency Tests U.S. Resolve and Plays Havoc
with Plans to Hand Over Control. How will the President Respond?, TIME, Apr. 19, 2004, at 34.
139. Kimmitt, supra note 2.
[Vol. 46:1
2005] COMBATANT STATUS AND INTERMEDIATE RECOGNITION
combatant status but certainly engaged in combat activities. They also
engaged in many open meetings and gatherings to voice support for
Muqtada Al-Sadr. Coalition forces could lawfully detain these
individuals as security internees 4 ° and then either prosecute them under
violations of domestic Iraqi law or Coalition Provisional Authority
Orders.' However, if the proposed incentive was in place, and the
security internees were dressed in Mahdi's Militia's distinctive black
uniforms with green arm- or headbands, those persons could be held as
security internees but not later prosecuted for the crimes associated with
speech or association.'
This immunity represents an incentive for the unlawful battlefield
fighter because if he is detained while in civilian clothes, he can
immediately be prosecuted for violations of the law; yet if he
distinguishes himself from the general populace, he receives immunity.
Though he may be detained, he cannot be prosecuted for those crimes.
This offer of immunity in exchange for the wearing of a uniform
represents a benefit to the occupier because it allows him to easily
distinguish those who are actively supporting the counterinsurgency. As
occupying forces move into a gathering of armed and unarmed people,
some wearing fixed distinctive emblems and some not, it is easy to
assess who the insurgents are.
140. GCC, supra note 43, art. 78.
141. See CPA Official Documents, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations (last
visited Sept. 21, 2005) (site scheduled to be taken down on June 30, 2006). For example, CPA
Order 14, concerning media organizations, states:
Media organizations are prohibited from broadcasting or publishing original, re-
broadcast, re-printed, or syndicated material that:
a) incites violence against any individual or group, including racial, ethnic or
religious groups and women;
b) incites civil disorder, rioting or damage to property;
c) incites violence against Coalition Forces or CPA personnel;
d) advocates alterations to Iraq's borders by violent means....
Coalition Provisional Authority Order 14: Prohibited Media Activity, available at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030610_CPAORD14ProhibitedMediaActivity.pdf
(last visited Oct. 10, 2005) (site scheduled to be taken down on June 30, 2006).
142. This proposal is somewhat analogous to the immunity given to civilians in GCC, article
70. See GCC, supra note 43, arts. 64-75. The occupier cannot prosecute or punish a protected
person during occupation for the support he may have provided to the armies defending against
the victorious occupier. OSCAR M. UHLER ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION
RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS 1N TIME OF WAR 348-49 (Jean S. Pictet
ed., Ronald Griffin & C.W. Dubleton trans., 1958). Particularly in the case of an insurgency as in
Iraq, the attempt is to throw off the occupier and establish a new government or restore the old. If
the insurgency is successful, the same principle of fighting for or against a prior government is
not punishable by the succeeding government.
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B. No Execution ofPunishment Until Conflict Resolved
Another incentive that should be implemented for those irregular
forces willing to distinguish themselves on the battlefield is to guarantee
that no punishment for their lawful combatant-like criminal activities
will be carried out until the end of hostilities. The use of the "end of
hostilities" standard as a measure for granting privileges is somewhat
analogous to provisions in both the GPW 14 3 and the GCC.'44 This
becomes especially important when considered with some of the other
proposals below, such as precluding the death penalty and the potential
grant of combatant immunity if the unlawful combatants' organization
later achieves combatant status.
Traditionally, unlawful combatants are subject to capture, detention,
trial and punishment like prisoners of war,'45 and also trial and
punishment by military tribunals for their unlawful acts on the
battlefield.'46 However, in most cases, a POW may only receive
disciplinary punishment,147 not to exceed thirty days of confinement.'48
In the few instances where a POW is subject to judicial process,'4 9 he
retains all the rights granted by the GPW, 5 ° including immunity for his
lawful warlike acts. 5 ' Further, once hostilities are over, unless he has
143. See GPW, supra note 43, arts. 118-19 (requiring POWs to be repatriated at the cessation
of hostilities unless suspected of war crimes).
144. Article 6 of the Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War states:
The present Convention shall apply from the outset of any conflict or occupation
mentioned in Article 2.
In the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application of the present Convention
shall cease on the general close of military operations.
In the case of occupied territory, the application of the present Convention shall
cease one year after the general close of military operations....
Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, supra note 43, art.
6.
145. See GPW, supra note 43, arts. 83-108.
146. Berman, supra note 59, at 68.
147. GPW, supra note 43, art. 83.
148. Id. arts. 89-90.
149. There is some debate over whether this would involve only war crimes committed prior
to capture or also crimes committed during detention. Compare COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR, supra note 142, with
Howard S. Levie, War Crimes in the Persian Gulf, 1996 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC
L.J. 153, 155-56 (1996).
150. GPW, supra note 43, art. 108, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 14, at
466-67.
151. Jordan J. Paust, Current Pressures on International Humanitarian Law: War and Enemy
Status after 9/11: Attacks on the Law of War, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 325, 330 (2003).
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committed war crimes, he is repatriated to the civilian population with
no further criminal consequences. His punishment for having been
captured as a lawful combatant is really only detention until the end of
the conflict. 
152
Protected persons under the GCC also enjoy certain protections.153
They cannot be prosecuted for crimes committed or opinions expressed
prior to the occupation,1 54 and they have the right to most modem
guarantees of a fair trial.15 5 They also may be interred as security
internees or put under house arrest.' 56 This restraint can continue for
extended periods, conceivably to the end of the occupation,'57 but must
be reviewed periodically.'58 Protected persons also can be prosecuted for
criminal activity.'59 While unlawful combatants may or may not deserve
these benefits, they merit some additional protections if they are willing
to wear uniforms.
A "no execution of punishment until after the conflict is resolved"
standard is reasonable, follows from the facts of the situation, and
represents a clear incentive for the unlawful fighter. Without this
provision, he is likely to be summarily dealt with, potentially tried, and
executed 6° depending on the nations involved in the conflict. However,
his movement may be successful and his fellow partisans brought to
power. In that case, if he had not had his punishment executed but was
merely being held until the conflict was resolved, he would certainly be
freed from any prison in which he was languishing. Further, it is only
the punishment that must be held in abeyance so a trial could go
forward and if acquitted, the unlawful belligerent goes free. If
convicted, the unlawful belligerent may be held as a security internee
until the conflict is resolved and he begins to serve his punishment, or
until he is freed because he no longer represents a threat. 161
152. GPW, supra note 43, art. 118.
153. GCC, supra note 43, art. 70.
154. Id. arts. 64-75.
155. Id. arts. 71-75.
156. Id. art. 78.
157. Id. art. 77.
158. Id.
159. Id. arts. 64-75.
160. Mark Mathews, Kashmir Conflict an Old Grudge; But New Escalation by India,
Pakistan has Higher Stakes, BALT. SuN, Dec. 29, 2001, at IA; Hundreds of Chechens Said
Missing, AP Online, June 4, 2001, available at LEXIS, CURNWS File; Ex-Dictator Starts
University Lectures, Press Ass'n, Sep. 29, 1997, available at LEXIS, CURNWS File; Risky New
Role for Mexico's Army, UPI, Oct. 19, 1996, available at LEXIS, CURNWS File.
161. GCC, supra note 43, arts. 43, 78.
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This also offers a clear benefit to the lawful battlefield forces. Again,
the fact that the unlawful fighter has donned a uniform and chosen to
distinguish himself not only will spare the civilian population, but will
make him much easier to target and either kill or capture. The
requirement to detain the captured belligerent will prove an
inconvenience for the lawful forces, but is an exchange most forces will
be willing to make for an increased ability to identify the enemy. The
lawful forces could also decide to offer parole for detained unlawful
combatants as discussed below to relieve them of the detention
requirement.
C. Offer of Parole, Including Immunity for Weapons Crimes not
Resulting in Death or Injury
Collecting large numbers of POWs and/or detainees is always
problematic for an armed force, and especially so for an invading force.
The required expenditure of resources can be quite burdensome to a
force even as well supplied as the United States.162 Offering parole to
unlawful combatants may be a way not only to decrease the significant
logistics requirements required for detainees, but also to provide
incentives for those same detainees to distinguish themselves by
wearing uniforms.
Parole, as commonly used in international law, is "releasing a
prisoner of war.. .in return for a pledge not to bear arms." '163 The practice
has been used since at least the age of the Roman Empire and continued
into the twentieth century.'64 Parole was codified in the 1907 Hague
Convention'65 and in the 1949 GPW 166 and remains a viable concept
162. See David Rose, Guantanamo Bay on Trial, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2004, at 88 (discussing
Halliburton's $135 million government contract to upgrade the detainee facilities at Guantanamo
Bay).
163. Gary D. Brown, Prisoner of War Parole: Ancient Concept, Modern Utility, 156 MIL. L.
REV. 200, 200 (1998).
164. For an excellent history on the use of parole, see id. at 201-09.
165. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex,
Oct. 18, 1907, art. 10, reprinted in SCHINDLER& TOMAN, supra note 34, at 78. Article 10 of the
Convention states:
Prisoners of war may be set at liberty on parole if the laws of their country allow,
and, in such cases, they are bound, on their personal honour, scrupulously to fulfil, both
towards their own Government and the Government by whom they were made
prisoners, the engagements they have contracted.
Id. art. 10.
166. See GPW, supra note 43, art. 21 ("Prisoners of war may be partially or wholly released
on parole or promise, in so far as is allowed by the laws of the Power on which they depend.").
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today, though it is seldom used and proscribed by the United States for
use by its military members.167 Joshua Clover has urged the
reinstatement of the possibility for parole, for use with the Guantanamo
detainees. 6 ' He advances three reasons why parole of that particular
group of detainees would be advantageous:
First, paroling these detainees would alleviate concerns over the
fact that they may otherwise be held indefinitely. Second,
although they may appear to be "freed," paroled prisoners of war
are prohibited from being employed in active military service
against their original captors. Third, if these parolees are later
discovered to have "broken" their parole, the original detaining
power, in this case the United States, "has extensive options in
dealing with the miscreant." Though the laws of war conflict on
some of the procedural specifics, the parole breaker could
conceivably lose his prisoner of war status.'69
These same advantages would apply to a much more general
application of the principle of parole to unlawful combatants who
distinguish themselves from noncombatants. Knowing that parole may
be offered to those who distinguish themselves (so long as they have not
otherwise committed murder or other serious violations of the law of
war) is an incentive that will potentially affect some of the most devout
insurgents.
A counterargument might be that if these unlawful fighters are
already violating the law of war by not complying with the four criteria
of combatancy, they have no reason to comply with a grant of parole
that relies on personal honor to a large degree.70 There is some risk
involved, but treating parole-breaking as a grave breach'7'and exercising
universal jurisdiction,' would, if nothing else, give overwhelming
recourse and act as a deterrent. A similar system has been used in
167. See Exec. Order No. 10,631, 20 Fed. Reg. 6,057, art. III (Aug. 17, 1955), amended by
Exec. Order No. 12,017, 42 Fed. Reg. 57,941 (Nov. 3, 1977),further amended by Exec. Order
No. 12,633, 53 Fed. Reg. 10,355 (Mar. 30, 1988) (establishing the code of conduct for the U.S.
armed forces that requires members of the military to deny parole from the enemy).
168. Clover, supra note 44, at 370.
169. Id. (citations omitted).
170. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 6, at 721 n.244; Brown, supra note 163, at 210-11.
171. See generally GCC, supra note 43, arts. 43, 147. Historically, parole violators were
subject to death. Bradford, supra note 6, at 724 n.266.
172. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239,
253 (2000).
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Iraq,173 though there is no unclassified report on its success at this point.
Further, it is important to note that parole would only be offered to those
who had sufficient incentive to put on a uniform and make themselves a
target, rather than take the easier and safer method of fighting from
among the civilian crowds and immediately disappearing into safety. It
may be that those willing to so identify themselves to gain the
opportunity of parole will also have the integrity to honor their parole
obligations.
Though the parolee would still not have the right to combatant
immunity, and, therefore, could be prosecuted for any unlawful killing
or injury he had caused in the course of his actions, this parole may also
include a grant of immunity for weapons crimes that do not result in
death or serious injury." 4 Further, the parole might include a grant of
immunity from other unlawful combat activities such as sabotage or
destruction of military property belonging to the opposing forces,
providing it did not result in death or serious injury.175
The benefits to unlawful combatants of parole are great and should
serve as a considerable incentive to wear a uniform. Insurgencies and
guerrilla warfare are often full of sabotage and other non-deadly
activities. For these activities, parole would exist as an option so long as
the unlawful combatant was willing to mark himself as a target. Further,
the offer of parole provides the unlawful combatant the opportunity to
return to his home and care for his family and return to normal life,
though now removed from continuing the conflict.
Distinction again provides the benefits to the lawful combatants. The
ability to see the saboteur for who he is, before he completes his work is
of incredible value, certainly worth returning him to society on the
grounds that he will fit himself back into the compliant civilian
population. The risks of parole violation bear heavy thought before
granting parole, but are likely risks worth taking.
173. See Richard A. Oppel, Jr., 5 Iraqis Die in Gunfight After Bomb Hits US. Convoy, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005, at A3 (detailing the release of Iraqi detainees into the supervision of
community "guarantors").
174. See generally Coalition Provisional Authority, Order Number 3 (Revised) (Amended),
(order entered into force Dec 31, 2003), at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
20031231_CPAORD3_REV AMD_.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (site scheduled to be taken
down on June 30, 2006).
175. For descriptions and analyses of guerrilla warfare, see Johnie Gombo, Understanding
Guerrilla Warfare (1990), at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/GJ.htm
(last visited Sept. 21, 2005) (providing an overview of the nature of guerrilla warfare) and Lopez,
supra note 9, at 928-29 (1994) (addressing the challenge of distinguishing combatant and civilian
status during guerrilla warfare as defined under the Geneva Convention).
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D. Compliance with International Law as Mitigation at Sentencing
In cases where parole is either not offered or inappropriate, such as
cases of death or serious injury, allowing evidence of the unlawful
combatant's compliance with the uniform requirement and other
requirements of the combatancy criteria could be used as mitigation
evidence at sentencing in any trial to which the unlawful belligerent was
subject. Louise Doswald-Beck has urged such a course of action. In
looking for an incentive approach to encouraging compliance, she has
written "[t]he carrot could be, for example, allowing respect of
international law rules to be used in mitigation of sentence when such
persons are tried in national courts."' 7 6
Such a measure would have to be sufficiently publicized and would
be less effective with trials that took place after the conflict, but may
still have some effect on the mind of the unlawful combatants. The
amount of mitigation provided would obviously be of significance as
well. This, however, would be a matter of judicial decision and likely
out of the power of the lawful combatants.
There is precedent for allowing compliance with the law of war as
mitigating circumstances at trials. In the Nuremburg Trials after World
War II, there are at least two examples of the Tribunal mitigating
punishments based on attempts to comply with the law of war.'7 7 This
would act as an incentive for the unlawful combatants by providing
them at least the possibility of a mitigated sentence at trial. As
mentioned above, because the current state of the law provides for no
benefits at trial for those who do not achieve full combatant status,
many unlawful combatants will be compelled to fight to the death rather
than surrender without hope for a fair or mitigated sentence. Following
this pattern established at Nuremburg may provide incentives to do
otherwise.
On the other hand, allowing mitigation at sentencing is a small price
to pay for the ability to identify the unlawful combatant. The difference
between sending someone to jail for a short period as opposed to a
longer period is generally of little significance to the invader or
occupier. By the time the unlawful combatant is released from even his
176. DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 72, at 56.
177. See United States of America v. Flick, 9 L.R.T.W.C. 1, 29 (1949); United States of
America v. List, 11 T.W.C. 757, 1300 (Nuremburg Military Trib. 1948). See generally William
A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 461, 492-93 (1997) (describing numerous examples of sentences mitigated by the
Nuremburg Tribunals).
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mitigated sentence, it is likely that the insurgency will have been
overcome and the government will firmly be in place or the invader will
have been repelled and the old government reinstated.
E. No Death Penalty
If convicted at trial despite any potentially mitigating testimony
concerning an unlawful belligerent's wearing of a uniform, he may face
punishments as severe as death, depending on his actions. Both the
GCC 7 ' and GPW'7 9 allow for the death penalty under certain
circumstances. The language of article 68 of the GCC is particularly
appropriate as it deals specifically with unlawful belligerents. It states in
pertinent part:
The penal provisions promulgated by the Occupying Power in
accordance with Articles 64 and 65 may impose the death
penalty on a protected person only in cases where the person is
guilty of espionage, of serious acts of sabotage against the
military installations of the Occupying Power or of intentional
offences which have caused the death of one or more persons,
provided that such offences were punishable by death under the
law of the occupied territory in force before the occupation
began.
The death penalty may not be pronounced against a protected
person unless the attention of the court has been particularly
called to the fact that since the accused is not a national of the
Occupying Power, he is not bound to it by any duty of
allegiance.
In any case, the death penalty may not be pronounced against a
protected person who was under eighteen years of age at the time
of the offence.'
178. See GCC, supra note 43, art. 68.
179. See GPW, supra note 43, art. 100:
Prisoners of war and the Protecting Powers shall be informed, as soon as possible, of
the offences which are punishable by. the death sentence under the laws of the Detaining
Power.
Other offences shall not thereafter be made punishable by the death penalty without
the concurrence of the Power upon which the prisoners of war depend. The death
sentence cannot be pronounced on a prisoner of war unless the attention of the court has,
in accordance with Article 87, second paragraph, been particularly called to the fact that
since the accused is not a national of the Detaining Power, he is not bound to it by any
duty of allegiance, and that he is in its power as the result of circumstances independent
of his own will.
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The first paragraph establishes two threshold questions before the
death penalty can be considered for an unlawful combatant in an
occupation: the type of crime and the law of the country occupied. Both
are questions that would be resolved by the detaining power or tribunal
before which the unlawful belligerent appears. The examples of crimes
listed are precisely the type of acts unlawful combatants do and
therefore represents little limitation on the use of the death penalty.''
Historically, summary execution was used as an option for violations
of the law of war 82 and trial, conviction, and execution by a military
tribunal is still lawful." 3 Customary international law also allows for the
use of the death penalty,8 4 though that is a trend that may be
changing.'85 One hundred and thirteen countries still allow the death
penalty, though it has not been used in some of those countries for more
than ten years."' There are certainly circumstances where the death
penalty is a sentencing option for convicted unlawful belligerents.
However, Thomas McDonnell has made the argument that the death
penalty in the case of terrorism is counterproductive. He argues that
using the death penalty against terrorists would lead to greater terrorism,
less cooperation from our allies, and greater danger to our military and
Id.
180. GCC, supra note 43, art. 68.
181. See Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Testimony as Delivered to the Senate
Armed Services Committee on the Transition in Iraq (June 25, 2004), in U.S. Dep't of Defense
Info., June 25, 2004, available at LEXIS, News File (addressing terrorist attacks and security
issues in Iraq).
182. See Lieber Code, supra note 24, arts. 20-25, 37, at 6-8; Gregory P. Noone, The History
and Evolution of the Law of War Prior to World War 11, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 176, 192 n.94 (2000).
183. See Norman L. Greene et al., Capital Punishment in the Age of Terrorism, 41 CATH.
LAW. 187, 205 (2001).
184. See, e.g., Heather Anne Maddox, After the Dust Settles: Military Tribunal Justice for
Terrorists After September 11, 2001, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 421, 453 (2002) (quoting
the 1940 U.S. War Department Rules of Land Warfare); Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes
of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 408 n.215 (1999); Walter G. Sharp, Sr.,
The Effective Deterrence of Environmental Damage During Armed Conflict: A Case Analysis of
the Persian Gulf War, 137 MIL. L. REV. 1, 35 (1992).
185. See Elizabeth A. Reimels, Comment, Playing for Keeps: The United States
Interpretation of International Prohibitions Against the Juvenile Death Penalty-The US. Wants
to Play the International Human Rights Game, But Only if It Makes the Rules, 15 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 303, 321 (2001) (arguing that the juvenile death penalty is a violation of customary
international law and that the drafters of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
equated the right to life with the abolition of the death penalty).
186. See Amnesty International, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, at
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-facts-eng (last modified Sept. 27, 2005) (last visited
Oct. 1, 2005).
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civilians abroad."8 7 These same arguments may also hold true with
unlawful combatants. It is important to note that none of the three
operating international criminal tribunals is authorized to administer the
death penalty.'
Removing the death penalty as a possible punishment would create
an incentive for at least a certain number of unlawful belligerents who
might meet the two criteria of the GCC or otherwise be subject to the
death penalty under customary international law or domestic law. Being
protected from the death penalty may mean long prison sentences, but it
may also mean eventual release through changing circumstances, such
as success of the insurgency or international pressure.'89 As with other
proposals, it would have to be publicized in advance for greatest effect,
and strictly adhered to when circumstances were appropriate.
For the lawful belligerents, the major detractor from such an
incentive is the issue of continued incarceration and its continuing
logistical requirements. However, that can serve as a visible reminder of
the veracity of the incentive and also of the penalties of fighting against
the lawful forces, whereas killing the unlawful belligerent may make
him a martyr to other like-minded noncombatants contemplating illegal
activities.
F. If the Movement Results in International Armed Conflict and the
Fighter Gets Subsequent Combatant Status, the Prior Lawful
Warlike Actions Are Also Covered by Combatant Immunity
Finally, one of the greatest incentives that can be given to unlawful
combatants to encourage them to wear uniforms is that if the movement
they are fighting for at some point obtains combatant status, their prior
actions would be covered by combatant immunity, so long as they
would have been lawful if they had been combatants at the time. In
other words, if an unlawful combatant conducts himself lawfully by
abiding by the laws of war in how he engages in hostile activity, and
does not qualify for combatant status only because of his non-
187. See Thomas M. McDonnell, The Death Penalty--An Obstacle to the "War Against
Terrorism"?, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 353, 400-417 (2004).
188. See Nora V. Demleitner, The Law and Politics of the Death Penalty: Abolition,
Moratorium, or Reform?: The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European
Lead?, 81 OR. L. REv. 131, 143-44 (2002).
189. See, e.g., Zimbabwe; President Arrives in New York for UN Assembly, AFR. NEWS, Sep.
12, 2002, available in LEXIS, News File (discussing international pressures to release freedom
fighters); Ken Adelman, Open the Doors to Burma; Engage Its Military Leaders in Dialogue,
WASH. TIMES, May 21, 2002, at A21.
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compliance with one of the other three criteria, he would be given
combatant immunity if his organization does eventually receive
combatant status.
A battlefield fighter's status is determined at the time he is
captured. 9 ' Once that determination is made, it is generally not
reconsidered unless there is some new evidence found that would
change that status. Recognition as combatants for members of his
organization could be such information that would cause a
reconsideration of an unlawful combatant's status, and grant him
combatant's status. For example, assume that an unlawful combatant is
part of an irregular force that is fighting an invading force but doesn't
meet the requirements of combatant status because the force is not
complying with the laws of war, due to most of the fighters not fighting
in uniforms. However, this particular battlefield fighter was fighting in a
distinctive emblem that was subsequently adopted by the rest of his
group and his group was then recognized as complying with the four
combatant status criteria and given combatant status. Because the
unlawful fighter was in uniform at the time of his capture, his status
ought to be revisited and he ought to be given combatant status.
This incentive adds value to the prior proposals advocating holding in
abeyance the execution of any punishment until the conflict is resolved
and the disallowance of the death penalty. Because the determination
may change over time, not executing the punishment, particularly the
death penalty, is important because the unlawful fighter's status may
change.
This provides obvious incentives for the unlawful belligerent. If he
believes that he deserves combatant status but his fellow fighters simply
have not got all the pieces of combatancy put together yet, he has a
concrete incentive to wear a uniform. This argument is an especially
important incentive to groups that are fighting in an internal armed
conflict where combatant status does not apply 9 ' but where the group
190. Canestaro, supra note 21, at 112-13 (describing the U.S. Supreme Court's treatment of
Nazi Saboteurs in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942)).
191. See supra note 55; see also Lopez, supra note 9, at 917:
The growing number of fatalities and atrocities in recent civil wars highlights the
inadequacy of the legal protections afforded to civilians, combatants, and peacekeepers
under existing international humanitarian law. Although civil wars present the same
horrors as international ones, they are governed by only a few, largely ineffective
provisions in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977.
These provisions offer little protection to combatants and civilians in conventional civil
wars, resulting in an unfortunate disparity between the protections afforded during
international and internal conflicts.
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believes that it will achieve sufficient recognition in the future to be
given combatant status.
For the lawful forces, not only does it allow easier targeting since the
fighter is now in uniform, but it also will act as an incentive for groups
to comply with all the requirements of combatant status. The
opportunity for eventual combatant status and combatant immunity will
have a powerful influence on prospective battlefield fighters and will be
a great encouragement to distinguish themselves on the battlefield.'92
V. CONCLUSION
Today's battlefields are populated by noncombatants as well as
combatants. Among those on the battlefield are many who do not meet
all four requirements of article 4 of the GPW and therefore do not
qualify for combatant status. Current international law requires a force
to meet all four requirements before granting any privileges. Without
this privilege of combatant status, these groups of "unlawful
belligerents" have no incentive to comply with any of the four criteria of
combatancy. This all-or-nothing approach is designed to encourage
groups to attempt to achieve combatant status. Instead, it acts as a
disincentive for groups who cannot meet all four criteria to attempt
compliance with any of the four requirements, including wearing a fixed
distinctive emblem to help distinguish them from the local populace.
The disincentive for unlawful belligerent groups to distinguish
themselves is counterproductive to the modern attempts to protect non-
combatants and to require combatants to refrain from military
operations that would adversely affect non-combatants. If soldiers
cannot distinguish who the enemy is, and if that enemy attacks from
civilian crowds, it is impossible to expect soldiers to not respond in self-
defense, thereby putting innocent noncombatants at risk. This can be
remedied by offering incentives for the unlawful combatants to
distinguish themselves by wearing uniforms. Providing incentives to
motivate unlawful combatants to wear uniforms can be achieved by
offering some benefits that they would not otherwise qualify for unless
they distinguish themselves, thus, making themselves targets and
Id. (citations omitted); Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law, and the Use of
Military Force, 18 Wis. INT'L L.J. 145, 182 (2000); cf Alex G. Peterson, Order Out of Chaos:
Domestic Enforcement of the Law of Internal Armed Conflict, 171 MIL. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2002)
(discussing the portions of international law that have become applicable to internal armed
conflicts).
192. Jinks, supra note 58, at 438.
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allowing the lawful forces to better protect the civilian populace. These
intermediate privileges include immunity from prosecution for speech
or association crimes connected with political beliefs; abeyance on trial
and execution of punishment until conflict is resolved; offering parole,
including immunity for weapons crimes not resulting in death or injury;
disallowance of the death penalty; and if the movement which the
fighter is a part of eventually achieves combatant status, the fighter's
prior lawful warlike actions will also be covered by combatant
immunity. Granting these privileges will provide real incentives to
unlawful combatants. Equally, the ability to distinguish the enemy that
will flow from having unlawful combatants wear uniforms is certainly
worth the exchange for privileges granted. Granting this intermediate
recognition for partial compliance with the requirements of combatancy
is a solution whose time has come.
* * *
